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The Facts
C, a patient detained in Broadmoor High Security Hospital pursuant to an order made under
section 37/41 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) applied to the Mental Health Review
Tribunal (“the tribunal”) for a discharge from hospital. The tribunal met on the 10th February
2000 and adjourned the application for a possible care plan to be formulated and for a further
report from the patient’s Responsible Medical Officer (“RMO”).
The hearing resumed on the 11th and 12th October 2000, when it had the benefit of further
reports from the RMO, the hospital social worker and the local authority social worker. There was
a difference of views expressed both as to the suitability of discharge, and in the event that a
conditional discharge1 was considered appropriate the conditions that should be imposed.
Crucially part of the written evidence that the local authority social worker had prepared for the
tribunal, consisting of her assessment of the needs of the patient should he be discharged, was not
submitted as part of the written evidence. She was not present at the hearing to give oral evidence.
The tribunal after hearing all the evidence decided that the patient should be conditionally
discharged, and that the discharge should be deferred2 until the resources necessary to meet the
conditions were assembled. In reaching this decision it appears that the tribunal had preferred the
evidence of the hospital social worker to that of the RMO. The tribunal imposed a condition that:–
“The patient has access to such psychiatric treatment as he may need from time to time.” 
They imposed this condition rather than the more usual condition that a psychiatrist in the
community should supervise the patient.
The reasons given by the tribunal to support the decision were most probably defective. As Mr.
Justice Collins stated in the Administrative Court: –
“With great respect to the Tribunal, those are no reasons at all. It may well be that that
deficiency could, had the Secretary of State so wished have justified an application for judicial
review. I have no doubt whatever that those reasons were entirely defective.”3
1 Section 73(2) MHA.
2 Section 73(7) MHA.
3 Paragraph 26 of the judgment in the Administrative
Court [2001] EWHC Admin 501.
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The community-based local authority social worker learnt that the statement of needs she had
prepared in May 2000, had not been before the tribunal, and on the 30th October wrote enclosing
a copy of the statement, and highlighting the differences between her view and that of the hospital
social worker.
The Secretary of State (S of S) who had opposed C’s discharge then exercised his power to refer4
his case to a new tribunal on the basis that:–
“Apparent confusion over the documentation was very important because of the extreme rarity
of a restricted patient being discharged without a condition of psychiatric supervision and the
problems that this presents.”5
The effect of such a referral back to the tribunal is to deprive the patient of the deferred
conditional discharge that he had obtained6.
The Patient sought Judicial Review of the reference by the S of S and on the 19th June 2001 in the
Administrative Court, Mr. Justice Collins gave judgment in favour of “C” and quashed the
decision of the S of S to refer “C’s” detention to the tribunal. 
The consequence of this decision was to introduce a fetter on the power under Section 71(1) of the
MHA, and as Counsel for the S of S put it when making her application for leave to appeal:–
“ ....... Your Lordship is well aware that there are no previous authorities on the extent of the
section 71 power, only authorities that give examples of that power. This case does therefore
break new ground .....”.
Leave to appeal was granted and the case came before the Court of Appeal on the 10th December
2001. After hearing argument but before judgment was delivered, the appeal in the case of IH7 was
lodged, and the Court of Appeal of its own motion decided that: –
“Having reserved judgment, we learned that Bell J’s decision in IH was to be the subject of
appeal. Because of the obvious impact that this appeal might have on the present case, we
arranged for the appeal of IH to come before us and directed that this appeal should be restored
for further argument at the same time.”8
The Law
The power of the tribunal to discharge a restricted patient is contained within S 73 MHA, which
imports the tests set out in S 72(1)(b)(i) & (ii) MHA. If either of these tests is satisfied and “it is
not appropriate for the patient to remain liable to recall to hospital for further treatment”9 then
the patient must be absolutely discharged.10 If the tribunal considers that it is appropriate that the
patient remains liable to be recalled then the patient must be conditionally discharged.11
4 Section 71(1) MHA.
5 Paragraph 11 of the judgment quoting from the witness
statement of the Home Office Civil Servant explaining
why the reference was made.
6 Section 73(7) MHA.
7 R (IH) v Nottinghamshire Healthcare Trust & Ors.
[2001] EWHC Admin 1037. R on the Application of
IH v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Ors
[2002] EWCA Civ 646. For a discussion of this highly
significant case, see ‘Deferred Conditional Discharges’
by David Mylan, Journal of Mental Health Law July
2002 pp 208 – 218.
8 Paragraph 27 of the judgment.
9 Section 73(1)(b) MHA as amended.
10 Section 73 (1) MHA.
11 Section 73 (2) MHA.
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Should the patient be conditionally discharged then “the patient shall comply with such conditions
(if any) as may be imposed at the time of discharge by the tribunal or at any subsequent time by
the Secretary of State.”12
If on the day of the hearing it is not possible to fulfil any conditions that the tribunal considers it
appropriate to impose: –
“A tribunal may defer a direction for the conditional discharge of a patient until such
arrangements as appear to the tribunal to be necessary for the purpose have been made to their
satisfaction.”13
The S of S may at any time refer the case of a restricted patient to a Mental Health Review
Tribunal.14
Should the S of S exercise this power in respect of a restricted patient whose conditional discharge
has been deferred, the effect is to place the patient in the same position he was before his case was
considered by the tribunal. The relevant statutory provision states as follows:
“ ...... where by virtue of any of any such deferment no direction has been given on an
application or reference before the time when the patient’s case comes before the tribunal on a
subsequent application or reference, the previous application or reference shall be treated as
one on which no direction under this section can be given.”15
Where difficulties arise in respect of meeting the conditions, the decision of the House of Lords
in the case of Campbell16 precluded any reconsideration by the tribunal of its decision. 
In the event that subsequent events indicate that the discharge should not take place or new
information suggests the proposed conditions may be inappropriate, the only function that
remained to the tribunal was to direct the conditional discharge as and when the necessary
arrangements had been made.
The objections made by C to the exercise of the power of referral to a new tribunal by the S of S
is concisely set out in the judgment of the Court of Appeal:
“Under the Act the role of a Tribunal is to decide the lawfulness of a patient’s detention in
accordance with Article 5(4) of the Convention. The Tribunal had decided that C’s detention
was unlawful and that C was entitled to be discharged, albeit subject to conditions. The
Secretary of State was bound to observe that decision. It was not open to him to abrogate it by
making a fresh reference without good reason. The fact that the Tribunal had reached its
decision without knowledge of Ms. Roden’s views did not constitute a good reason.”17
The Judgment
As noted above, C’s application to have the S of S’s referral to a new Tribunal quashed was upheld
at first instance in the Administrative Court. The S of S appealed. The appeal failed and the referral
remained quashed. Although the decision of both Courts was the same, the reasoning was totally
different. In the Administrative Court the case went against the S of S because the Judge found that
the S of S had misdirected himself as to the test that he should apply before making a Section 71(1)
12 Section 73(4)(b) MHA.
13 Section 73(7) MHA.
14 Section 71(1) MHA.
15 Section 73(7) MHA.
16 Campbell v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[1988] 1 AC 120.
17 Paragraph 19 of the judgment.
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reference. It was held that the mere existence of new information or the fact that there had been
an omission in respect of facts or opinions that should have been before the tribunal, was
insufficient. The S of S: –
“ ..... must form the view that it is probable that the material in question would have affected
the result in that it would have decided either that a more onerous condition be imposed or
that a conditional discharge would not have been ordered.”18
The Court of Appeal, having indicated that it did not find it easy to follow the reasoning of the
Administrative Court judgment, did not consider: –
“ ..... that it would be profitable to conduct a detailed analysis of the judgment below.”
The reason for this was because immediately before giving judgement, they had given judgment in
IH and had overruled Campbell on the grounds that it could not stand with Article 5(4) of the
Convention. In consequence the Court of Appeal was able to dismiss the appeal on the grounds
that: –
“This departure from the decision in Campbell leaves no doubt as to what the S of S should
have done on the facts of this case. He should have invited the Tribunal to reconsider its
decision, taking into account the views of Ms. Roden, which should have been before it at the
time of its original decision. There was no justification for his making a fresh referral and,
thereby, removing the matter from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal altogether.”19
Discussion
The significance of C is perhaps in the judgment at first instance rather than that of the Court of
Appeal. Once Campbell had been reversed and the Court in IH set out the “New Regime” for the
way in which tribunals should approach the implementation of the conditional discharge of a
patient, in circumstances where the discharge cannot be immediately implemented and in
consequence has to be deferred, the outcome of the appeal was a foregone conclusion. IH makes
it clear that the decision of a tribunal to make a conditional discharge and then to defer, is a
provisional decision20 and not a final decision. The tribunal can then re-consider as many times as
it considers appropriate. With this power, there is obviously no necessity for a Section 71(1)
reference as the S of S can request the original tribunal panel, which has already acquired
knowledge of the facts of the detention, to reconsider its decision.
Counsel for the S of S argued unsuccessfully before the Court of Appeal that the appeal should
be allowed because at the time the S of S had no option but to proceed on the basis that Campbell
was good law. The Court rejected this on the basis that: –
“What is in issue is not whether the S of S is to be criticised for the course that he took, but
whether his decision was lawful. For the reasons that we have given, we have held that it was not”.
It was unfortunate that the Court of Appeal did not conduct a detailed analysis of the judgment
below because the reasoning of Mr. Justice Collins in the Administrative Court quite clearly
introduced a fetter to a power of the S of S. This is a power that is explicitly provided in primary
legislation and which is not fettered by any provision within the MHA. 
18 Paragraph 60 of the judgment in the Administrative
Court quoted at paragraph 22 of the judgment in the
Court of Appeal.
19 Paragraph 29 of the judgment.
20 Rule 2 of the Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules
1983 (S.I. 1983 No.942)
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The powers of the S of S in relation to restricted patients arise as a consequence of Hadfield’s
Case21 which prompted the passing of two Statutes22 to create a system for dealing with criminal
lunatics. The system precluded discharge without the consent of the Crown and reserved to the
Crown further powers in respect of the treatment of such patients. 
The powers have remained substantially intact for over 200 years. The major modification arose as
a consequence of the European case of X v UK23 which led to the provision within the MHA of
a new power for the Mental Health Review Tribunal to discharge restricted patients in place of the
advisory function they previously had under the Mental Health Act 1959. 
This has so far been the primary statutory modification to the powers of the S of S in 200 years,
and is not so much a restriction on the power of the State because the S of S retains the power to
discharge24, but rather a sharing of the power with a judicial body. 
Various other powers are not shared. These include the power to restrict the grant of leave of
absence under section 17 MHA25; the power to restrict the transfer of the patient to another
hospital26; and the power to restrict the discharge of the patient by the RMO from detention.27
The S of S has the sole power to recall the conditionally discharged patient to hospital28 although
the case of the recalled patient must then be referred to a tribunal.29
The Administrative Court judgment introduced in certain specific circumstances a fetter on the S
of S’s power to refer a restricted patient to a tribunal. Because post-IH, the decision of the tribunal
to order a conditional discharge deferred is now a provisional decision, it is now unlikely that the
S of S would ever again seek to use the Section 71(1) power in such circumstances. The judgment
can however be seen as introducing a further Human Rights Act-inspired chink into the power of
the State in respect of restricted patients. It remains to be seen to what extent, if any, the judgment
can be used in relation to any of the continuing powers.
21 Hadfield’s Case (1800) 27 Howell’s St. Tr.
22 39 & 40 George III Chapter 93 “An Act for regulating
Trials for High Treason and Misprision of High
Treason, in certain Cases” and 39 & 40 George III
Chapter 94 “An Act for the Safe Custody of Insane
Persons charged with Offences”. 
23 X v United Kingdom (Detention of a Mental Patient)
(1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 188
24 Section 42(2) MHA.
25 Section 41(3)(c)(i) MHA.
26 Section 41(3)(c)(ii) MHA.
27 Section 41(3)(c)(iii) MHA.
28 Section 42(3) MHA.
29 Section 75(1)(a) MHA.
